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California Retail Sales Tax Law After
Diamond: Facets of a Continuing
Problem
The legal incidence' of the California retail sales tax has provided
fertile ground for litigation since the genesis of the sales tax in 1933.2
The focal point of litigation involving this aspect of the sales tax is
whether the tax is assessed against the United States Government 3
when the government purchases tangible personal property in Califor-
nia.4 This issue is dependent upon whether the incidence of the sales
tax falls on the retailer or the purchaser.' Generally, if the incidence
falls directly on the United States Government as purchaser, a sales tax
cannot be imposed without violating the principle of federal immunity
from state taxation. If the incidence falls on the retailer, however, it is
theoretically irrelevant that the purchaser may be the federal govern-
ment because there is no direct taxation of the purchaser.
The California Legislature, in enacting the California Retail Sales
Tax Act in 1933, declared the sales tax to be imposed on the retailer for
the privilege of selling tangible personal property within the state.'
This principle was challenged shortly after its inception in Western
Lithograph Company v. State Board ofEqualization.9 Under considera-
tion in Western Lithograph was whether a retailer was entitled to a re-
fund for sales tax paid on the sale of tangible personal property to a
national bank."° The retailer had not passed on the tax as part of the
1. The term "legal incidence" is used to indicate the person or activity upon which a tax is
placed. See text accompanying notes 81-84 and 90 infra.
2. See generally Western Lithograph Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d 156, 78
P.2d 731 (1938); Xerox Corp. v. County of Orange, 66 Cal. App. 3d 746, 136 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1977);
Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. De Salvo, 136 Cal. App. 2d 156, 288 P.2d 317 (1955); Pacific
Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, 111 Cal. App. 2d 31, 244 P.2d 21 (1952); Clary v. Basalt Rock Co., 99
Cal. App. 2d 458, 222 P.2d 24 (1950).
3. The use of the terms United States, United States Government or federal government
hereinafter will encompass the instrumentalities of the United States. Examples of such instru-
mentalities are: federal home loan banks, federal credit unions, federal land banks, and interme-
diate credit banks. See 12 U.S.C. §§1433, 1768, 2055, 2079 (1976).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459-60 (1977).
7. See First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 347 (1968); City of
Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 492 (1958).
8. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 1020, §§l, 3, at 2599-2600.
9. 11 Cal. 2d 156, 78 P.2d 731 (1938).
10. Id. at 158, 78 P.2d at 732.
Pacfc Law Journal / Vol 11
purchase price but had paid the amount of sales tax due the state."
The national bank was conceded to be an instrumentality of the United
States, and as such, to be exempt from state sales tax. 12 The California
Supreme Court upheld the position of the state that the tax fell upon
the retailer and, therefore, was properly imposed on sales to the na-
tional bank.13 As a result, the retailer was not entitled to a refund of
the sales tax. Since the decision in Western Lithograph, California
courts have consistently construed the sales tax law in accordance with
the expressed intent of the legislature and with the pronouncement of
the California Supreme Court. 4 Nevertheless, in 1976 the United
States Supreme Court, in Diamond National Corporation v. State Board
of Equalization,'5 held that the incidence of the California retail sales
tax falls on the purchaser, not the retailer.' 6 Consequently, the plaintiff
national bank, as a purchaser of tangible personal property, was held to
be exempt from California sales tax imposed prior to 1969.' 7 Applica-
ble provisions of the United States Code in existence prior to 1969 had
permitted several forms of state taxation of national banks although
sales taxation was not included among the permissible methods.' 8 Less
than three weeks after the Diamond decision, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the California sales tax as applied to leases of
tangible personal property to the United States Government was a vio-
lation of the constitutional immunity from state taxation of the federal
government.' 9
In response to the Diamond decision, Senate Bill 472 was enacted by
the California Legislature to reaffirm that for both state and federal
purposes, the retail sales tax is imposed on the retailer for the privilege
of conducting a retail business within California.20 Senate Bill 472 re-
II. See id. at 158, 78 P.2d at 732.
12. Id. at 158, 78 P.2d at 733.
13. Id. at 167, 78 P.2d at 737.
14. See, eg., De Aryan v. Akers, 12 Cal. 2d 781, 87 P.2d 695 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
581 (1939); Xerox Corp. v. County of Orange, 66 Cal. App. 3d 746, 136 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1977);
Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. De Salvo, 136 Cal. App. 2d 156, 288 P.2d 317 (1955); Pacific
Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, Ill Cal. App. 2d 31, 244 P.2d 21 (1952); Clary v. Basalt Rock Co., 99
Cal. App. 2d 458, 222 P.2d 24 (1950).
15. 425 U.S. 268 (1976).
16. Id. at 268.
17. Id.
18. 12 U.S.C. §548 (1976). In 1969, 12 U.S.C. §548 was amended to permit national banks to
be taxed in the same manner as state banks, which currently are subject to special taxes in lieu of
all other taxes. See CAL. CONST. art. 13, §27; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §23182. Accordingly, the
imposition of the sales tax on sales to state and national banks is permissible as a matter of state
law, independently of a claim of federal immunity, because the sales tax is imposed on the retailer
under state law. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §6051. Other agencies of the federal government,
however, are exempt from state sales taxation under state or federal law. See CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §6381. See note 43 infra.
19. United States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 536 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1976).
20. CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1211, §19, at--.
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pealed and amended various sections of the Revenue and Taxation
Code that could have been construed as inconsistent with this con-
cept.2 Senate Bill 472 also added to the Civil Code a sales tax reim-
bursement schedule2 2 and two presumptions.2 3 Sales tax
reimbursement as used in this context means an express or implied con-
tractual arrangement between the retailer and the purchaser that the
purchaser will reimburse the retailer for the state sales tax obligation
incurred in the transaction.24 The two presumptions are that the re-
tailer and purchaser have agreed to the addition of sales tax reimburse-
ment to the sales price of tangible personal property and that the
property is sold at a price that includes tax reimbursement.25
The objective of this legislation is to enable the state to realize the
sales tax revenue derived from leases of tangible personal property to
the United States Government and from sales of such property to cer-
tain instrumentalities of the federal government that otherwise would
be exempt from state sales taxation.26 By reexpressing the legislative
intent that the sales tax is a privilege tax on the retailer for all tax pur-
poses, state and federal, the legislature has attempted to circumvent an
application of the Diamond holding should the federal government
challenge again the incidence of the sales tax.27 The avowed purpose
of the inclusion of the sales tax reimbursement schedule and the pre-
21. See, e.g., CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 296, §5, at 706 (enacting CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §6052.5);
CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 36, §1, at 536 (enacting CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§6052, 6053, 6054).
22. See CAL. Civ. CODE §1656.1(c)(1).
23. See id. §1656.1(a). This section provides:
Whether a retailer may add sales tax reimbursement to the sales price of the tangible
personal property sold at retail to a purchaser depends solely upon the terms of the
agreement of sale. It shall be presumed that the parties agreed to the addition of sales
tax reimbursement to the sales price of tangible personal property sold at retail to a
purchaser if:
(1) The agreement of sale expressly provides for such addition of sales tax reim-
bursement;
(2) Sales tax reimbursement is shown on the sales check or other proof of sale; or
(3) The retailer posts in his premises in a location visible to purchasers, or includes
on a price tag or in an advertisement or other printed material directed to purchasers, a
notice to the effect that reimbursement for sales tax will be added to the sales price of all
items or certain items, whichever is applicable.
Section 1656.1(b) provides:
It shall be presumed that the property, the gross receipts from the sale of which is subject
to the sales tax, is sold at a price which includes tax reimbursement if the retailer posts in
his premises, or includes on a price tag or in an advertisement (whichever is applicable)
one of the following notices:
(1) "All prices of taxable items include sales tax reimbursement computed to the near-
est mill."
(2) "The price of this item includes sales tax reimbursement computed to the nearest
mill."
24. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §6051; CAL. CIV. CODE §1656.1. See text accompanying
notes 36-38 infra.
25. CAL. CIv. CODE §1656.1.
26. See generally CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1211, §19 at -. See note 3 supra and note 43 infra.
27. See CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1211, §19, at-.
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sumptions concerning sales tax reimbursement was for use in determin-
ing a proper measure of sales tax and for obtaining the benefit of an
income tax deduction of the sales tax paid by the purchaser.28 It is
evident that the State of California has attempted to alter the retail
sales tax law to avoid a claim that the operation of the tax law runs
afoul of the constitutional immunity currently enjoyed by the federal
government. At stake in this controversy are the competing demands
for state revenue and federal autonomy.
The purpose of this comment will be to demonstrate that Senate Bill
472 has not and cannot alter California sales tax law in any manner
that would withstand another federal tax immunity challenge before
the United States Supreme Court. This will be illustrated by identify-
ing in the case law the test utilized by the United States Supreme Court
to determine whether federal immunity has been violated by a state tax
and by applying the test to California sales tax law. The reasons for the
resulting failure of Senate Bill 472 to circumvent the Diamond decision
and the remaining alternatives will be adduced.
BACKGROUND: CALIFORNIA RETAIL SALES TAx LAW
States enacted sales tax measures to fulfill the demands on govern-
ment created by the enlarged scope of governmental activities follow-
ing World War I and the depression of the 1930's.29 The first such
enactment in California, the Retail Sales Tax Act of 1933, imposed a
tax on retailers for the privilege of selling tangible personal property,
measured by the gross receipts from the sale of such property within
the state.30 In order to reach tangible personal property that was used,
stored, or consumed in California but was purchased outside the state
or in interstate commerce, the Use Tax Act of 1935 was enacted to im-
pose an excise tax at the same rate as the sales tax, payable by the
consumer.3" The two bodies of law were consolidated in 194132 to form
a complementary package for the purpose of assuring that all person-
alty sold or used in California is taxed.33 At that time the legislature
again expressed the intention to assess the sales tax as a privilege tax
imposed on the retailer.34
28. CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1211, §22, at-.
29. Rice & Estes, Sales and Use Taxes as Affected by Federal Governmental Immunity, 9
VAND. L. REV. 204, 211 (1956).
30. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 1020, §3, at 2600.
31. CAL. STATS. 1935, c. 361, §3, at 1298.
32. CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 36, §1, at 532.
33. Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167, 171 (1939).
34. CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 36, §1, at 536 (enacting CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §6051). The total
sales tax paid by the consumer is measured currently at the rate of six percent of the price agreed
upon at the initial sales transaction. Four and three-quarters percent is allocated to state govern-
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California courts, in interpreting the provisions of the sales tax law,
have uniformly held that the sales tax is to be imposed on the retailer.35
Thus, the retailer is solely obligated to pay the tax and has no right of
action against the consumer if the consumer does not agree to the addi-
tion of the sales tax to the price.36 Reimbursement of the retailer for
the sales taxes paid has been a matter of contractual arrangement be-
tween retailer and purchaser, 37 and when the contract is silent on the
question of tax, the purchaser cannot be made to pay.38 The law has
thus been interpreted by the California courts to create a relationship
between the sovereign and the retailer, not between the state and the
consumer.39 Despite this theoretical appraisal, in practice the sales tax
results in an increased burden on the purchaser. If the purchaser is the
federal government, a contractor or distributor dealing under contract
with the government, or a government employee or officer, the question
arises whether the increased financial burden amounts to an unconsti-
tutional violation of federal immunity from state taxation.40
FEDERAL IMMUNITY FROM STATE TAXATION
There are two sources to which federal immunity from state taxation
can be traced. As first enunciated by Justice Marshall in the United
States Supreme Court decision of McCulloch v. Maryland,4 1 one basis
for federal immunity is found, by implication, in the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.42 The second source of federal im-
munity is simply that specifically granted by federal law.43
ment and the other one and one-quarter percent is returned by the state to local government under
the Bradley-Bums Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law. See generally CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE §§6051, 7200-11. An additional one-half percent is permitted to be levied in counties com-
posing rapid transit districts. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §7261.
35. Western Lithograph Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, I1 Cal. 2d 156, 162, 78 P.2d 731,
734 (1938); Xerox Corp. v. County of Orange, 66 Cal. App. 3d 746, 756, 136 Cal. Rptr. 583, 589
(1977); Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. De Salvo, 136 Cal. App. 2d 156, 160, 288 P.2d 317, 319
(1955); Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, 111 Cal. App. 2d 31, 34, 244 P.2d 21, 23 (1952).
36. Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. De Salvo, 136 Cal. App. 2d 156, 161, 288 P.2d 317, 319
(1955); Clary v. Basalt Rock Co., 99 Cal. App. 2d 458, 461, 222 P.2d 24, 26 (1950).
37. Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, Ill Cal. App. 2d 31, 35, 244 P.2d 21, 24 (1952).
38. Id.
39. De Aryan v. Akers, 12 Cal. 2d 781, 785, 87 P.2d 695, 697 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 581
(1939); Western Lithograph Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d 156, 163, 78 P.2d 731, 735
(1938).
40. See, e.g., Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268 (1976); United
States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975); Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 393 U.S.
409 (1969) affg 291 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Fla. 1968); First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax
Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968); United States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 536 F.2d 295 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. State Bd. of Equalization, 450 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
41. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
42. See generally U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
43. See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. §107(a) (1970) (limitation of waiver of immunity from sales and use
taxes in federal areas); 12 U.S.C. §1433 (1976) (federal home loan banks); 12 U.S.C. §1825 (1976)
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.); 12 U.S.C. §1768 (1976) (federal credit unions); 12 U.S.C.
§2055 (1976) (federal land banks); 12 U.S.C. §2079 (1976) (intermediate credit banks); 12 U.S.C.
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In McCulloch v. Maryland, a state tax on the Bank of the United
States was interpreted to be an assertion of state power that frustrated
the operation of federal law and thus was impermissible.' A doctrine
of absolute immunity was fashioned with the supremacy clause as its
basis.45 Following the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, implied
governmental immunity was expanded to invalidate not only state
taxes that were directly imposed on the federal government, but also
those that indirectly imposed additional costs on the government.
46
The test used by the United States Supreme Court was an economic
one: if any economic burden of a tax fell on a governmental interest, it
necessarily created an interference with the operations of the federal
government, an interference prohibited by McCulloch v. Maryland.47
The power to tax was considered tantamount to the power to destroy.48
Correspondingly, the economic burden of afederal tax on state gov-
ernmental interests was prohibited under the reciprocal doctrine of in-
tergovernmental immunity.49 This constitutional immunity of either
government from taxation by the other arose from the requirement,
inherent in the constitutional system, that each government must be left
free from undue interference by the other in order to administer its
affairs within its own sphere.: 0 Beginning in the late 1920's, the Court
began to recognize an intrinsic limitation of the concept of implied in-
tergovernmental immunity.51 The recognition of this limitation led to a
retreat from the economic burden theory.52 In Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell,53 consulting engineers, under various contracts with the State
of Massachusetts and its subdivisions, sought to recover income taxes
paid by them to the United States.54 The grounds for entitlement to the
tax refund were that the engineers were employees or officers of the
state and thus were exempt from federal income taxation under the
§2098 (1976) (production credit associations and banks for cooperatives chartered under the Farm
Credit Act of 1933).
44. See 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936) (Alabama statute imposing tax on
withdrawal of gasoline from storage for use and sold to U.S. Army and T.V.A. unconstitutional);
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (Mississippi gasoline tax on distributors
who sold to United States unconstitutional); Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S.
435 (1842) (Pennsylvania income tax on federal officer's salary unconstitutional).
47. See 17 U.S. 316, 436-37 (1819).
48. Id. at 431.
49. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113, 122-28 (1871) (federal income tax on state judge un-
constitutional).
50. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 477-78 (1939); Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24 (1926). See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUnONAL LAW
367 (1978).
51. See Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
52. Id.
53. 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
54. Id. at 518.
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War Revenue Act." The Court held that the plaintiffs were not em-
ployees or officers of the state in their capacity of consulting engineers
under contract and as a result were not entitled to a refund. 6 The
Court did recognize, however, that taxation by either the state or the
federal government will necessarily affect the operating costs of the
other and that both governments must be permitted to function with a
minimum of interference by the other.5 1 Indeed, neither government
may seriously curtail the exercise of the powers nor impair the effi-
ciency of the functions of the other government.
58
The continued restriction of the intergovernmental immunity doc-
trine resulted in repudiation of the economic burden doctrine. 9 In
1937, the Supreme Court, applying a more flexible standard, held that a
state tax imposed on the gross receipts of a federal contractor was a
valid exaction since the tax was not assessed against the government
and the increased cost to the government did not substantially interfere
with the performance of federal functions.60
In 1941 the Court expressly discarded the economic burden theory
and, in its place, espoused a legal incidence test.6 ' In Alabama v. King
& Boozer,62 the Court held that a state sales tax was validly imposed on
the purchase of building materials by a contractor for use in perform-
ance of a "cost plus" building contract with the government. 63 Al-
though title to the material vested in the government upon delivery and
the government had agreed to reimburse the contractor for the sales
tax, the legal incidence of the tax was held to fall on the contractor-
purchaser.64 The factors influencing the Court's decision were that the
contractor, as purchaser, was not the agent or representative of the gov-
ernment, and that only the contractor was legally obligated to pay for
the material under the facts of the case.65
Since its origin in Alabama v. King & Boozer,66 the legal incidence
test has been consistently used to determine whether state or local taxes
55. Id.
56. Id. at 525-26.
57. Id. at 523-24.
58. See id.
59. See generally James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
60. Id. at 161. A tax to be a valid exaction also must be nondiscriminatory. United States v.
County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 451, 460, 464 (1977); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,
149-50 (1937).
61. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
62. 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
63. See id. at 14.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 9-10.
66. The elements of the legal incidence test have undergone some modification since 1941.
See text accompanying notes 81-84 infra.
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violate the immunity of the federal government.6 7 As a result, the fed-
eral immunity doctrine no longer extends to persons seeking to estab-
lish derivative immunity solely through their dealings or relationship
with the federal government.6 8 This proposition was illustrated in De-
troit v. Murray Corporation69 where city and county taxes levied
against a subcontractor under government contract were held not to
infringe upon the immunity of the federal government.70 The taxes
were based in part on the value of materials and "work in process" to
which the United States held legal title, but which were in the posses-
sion of the subcontractor. 7' Although the taxes were styled as personal
property taxes by the applicable Michigan statutes, they were imposed
directly on the subcontractor, not the United States or its property, and
the use of the property was for the private benefit of the subcontrac-
tor.72 Thus the Court found that the legal incidence of the taxes fell on
the subcontractors and not on the federal government.73
As recently as 1977, the legal incidence test was applied to permit the
imposition of an annual tax on possessory interests in housing owned
by the federal government. 74 In United States v. County of Fresno,75
the United States Forest Service owned housing on national forest
lands located in California and provided this housing to its employees
as part of their compensation.76 Fresno and Tuolumne Counties taxed
the possessory interests of the federal employees in the housing under
California statutes permitting the imposition of an annual tax on pos-
sessory interests in improvements on tax exempt land.77 In determin-
ing that the tax was constitutional, the Court noted that although the
tax created an economic burden on the government, the tax was none-
theless valid because it was neither directly imposed on the government
nor discriminatory.78 This case illustrates the distinction between di-
rect and indirect taxation under the legal incidence test and the effect of
such distinction: a tax that financially burdens governmental opera-
tions will be permitted so long as it is not discriminatory, directly im-
67. See, e.g., United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); United States v. Missis-
sippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975); Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200 (1975); City of Detroit v.
Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
68. See generally United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); Gurley v. Rhoden,
421 U.S. 200 (1975). But see United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975).
69. 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
70. Id. at 495.
71. Id. at 491.
72. Id. at 492-93.
73. Id. at 495.
74. See United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1977).
75. 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
76. Id. at 454.
77. Id. at 455-56.
78. Id. at 464.
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posed, nor indirectly burdensome.79 Thus, any tax whose legal
incidence falls directly on the federal government is prohibited. 0
To ascertain where the legal incidence of a tax falls, the applicable
taxing statute must be scrutinized. When a state sales tax purporting to
be an excise or privilege tax is challenged, the critical issues are two-
fold: (1) who does the statute claim to tax; and (2) if the statute claims
to tax the retailer, is the tax necessarily passed on to the purchaser?8' If
the statute expressly imposes the tax on the purchaser, the tax is invalid
if the purchaser is the federal government.8 2 Similarly, if the retailer is
required to pass on the tax to the purchaser, then the practical effect is a
direct imposition on the purchaser and, therefore, an invalid tax if the
purchaser is the federal government. 83 If the statute professes to tax the
retailer, it must be determined whether the practical effect of the statute
is nevertheless so direct as to constitute impermissible taxation.8a
In Diamond National Corporation v. State Board of Equalization,"5
the United States Supreme Court found that the California retail sales
tax was legally incident on the purchaser.8 6 Theper curiam opinion of
the majority decided the issue of the legality of the California taxing
scheme, predicating the decision on the Court's holding in First Agricul-
tural National Bank v. State Tax Commission. 87
In Agricultural National Bank, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court had determined that sales and use taxes imposed on purchases of
tangible personal property were proper as applied to sales to a national
bank. 8 One of the justifications advanced by the Massachusetts court
for the validity of the sales tax imposition was that the tax was a tax on
vendors, not on the bank as a purchaser.8 9 The United States Supreme
79. Id. at 462, 464.
80. Id. at 459.
81. See United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599, 608 (1975); First Agricul-
tural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
82. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 459 (1977).
83. See United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599, 607-08 (1975); First Agricul-
tural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1968); Federal Land Bank v. Bis-
marck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99 (1941).
84. See generally City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 492-93 (1958).
85. 425 U.S. 268 (1976).
86. Id. at 268. The Diamond decision, for all its import to the California treasury, consisted
of a single paragraph:
The judgment is reversed. We are not bound by the California court's contrary conclu-
sion and hold that the incidence of the state and local sales taxes falls upon the national
bank as purchaser and not upon the vendors. The national bank is therefore exempt
from the taxes under former 12 U.S.C. §548 (1964 ed.), which was in effect at the time
here pertinent. First Agricultural Nat. Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 346-48
(1968). Reversed.
87. 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
88. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 353 Mass. 172, 181, 197, 229 N.E.2d
245, 251, 260 (1967), rev'd 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
89. Id. at 251.
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Court reversed the decision of the Massachusetts court, holding that the
legal incidence of the tax was on the purchaser because the tax was
required to be passed on, and thus, was an impermissible direct tax.90
Furthermore, the Court determined the wording of the statute revealed
the intent of the Massachusetts Legislature that the sales tax be passed
on to the purchaser and that lack of sanction against the vendor for
refusing to pass on the tax did not mean the tax was on the vendor.91
The Court also stated that the interpretation of the statute, requiring
the retailer to pass on the tax, was reinforced by the prohibition against
any vendor advertising that the tax would be assumed or absorbed.
92
By inference, then, the Court found the California sales tax invalid
based on the same considerations.
A comparison of the Massachusetts statutes determined by the
United States Supreme Court to place the legal incidence of the sales
tax on the purchaser, with the relevant provisions of the California re-
tail sales tax law that were in effect at the time of the Diamond decision,
reveals striking similarities. The Massachusetts sales tax law provided
in part that:
Reimbursement for the tax hereby imposed shall be paid by the pur-
chaser to the vendor and each vendor ... shall add to the sales price
and shall collect from the purchaser the full amount of the tax... ;
and such tax shall be a debt from the purchaser to the vendor
93
In comparison, the California Revenue and Taxation Code, at the time
of the Diamond decision, provided that, "The tax hereby imposed shall
be collected by the retailer from the consumer in so far as it can be
done."94 Both the Massachusetts and California sales tax law con-
tained provisions prohibiting any advertisement that the sales tax
would be absorbed or assumed by the retailer.95 The construction
given the above statutes by the Massachusetts and California judiciary
is correspondingly parallel.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court construed the relevant provisions
of the Massachusetts sales tax law not to mandate that the tax be col-
lected from or passed on to the purchaser.96 Rather, these provisions
were interpreted to allow the retailer the option to add the tax to the
90. 392 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1968).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 347; MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN., c. 58, App. §1-1, subsec. 3.
94. CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 36, §1, at 536.
95. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., c. 58, App. §1-I, subsec. 23; CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 36, §1, at
536.
96. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 353 Mass. 172, 179-80 & n.14, 229
N.E.2d 245, 250 & n.14 (1967).
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selling price and were "aimed more at the cultivation of a happy rela-
tionship between the vendors and customers than at any mandate that
the tax be collected from the purchaser." 97 The prohibition against the
retailer advertising that the tax would be absorbed was deemed to pre-
vent the "small vendor" from being placed at a competitive disadvan-
tage with "larger retailers". 98
California courts have consistently determined that the applicable
provisions of the California tax law permitted the retailer to pass the
tax on to the purchaser but did not charge the retailer with the
mandatory duty of collection.99 The retailer was authorized to collect
the tax from the consumer "in so far as it may consistently be done" for
purposes of reimbursement.lcoo Authority to pursue reimbursement was
restricted when the existing contractual or constitutional rights of the
consumer would be infringed. 01 The consumer, therefore, had no im-
plied obligation in reference to the tax unless he agreed to be obli-
gated. 10 2 Reimbursement of the retailer for the tax depended on the
contractual arrangements of the parties. 10 3 California courts have de-
clared that the prohibition against advertising the absorbtion of the tax
did not require the retailer to add the sales tax as an additional
charge.1 4 Rather, the purpose of this prohibition was to "place retail-
ers on an equal basis since it is deemed unfair competition for the
strong to absorb the tax and build up his trade at the expense of the
weaker dealer who could not absorb it."10
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Xerox Corp. v. County of Orange, 66 Cal. App. 3d 746, 756, 136 Cal. Rptr. 583, 589
(1977); Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, Ill Cal. App. 2d 31, 34, 244 P.2d 21, 23 (1952).
100. De Aryan v. Akers, 12 Cal. 2d 781,786, 87 P.2d 695, 697 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 581
(1939); Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, 111 Cal. App. 2d 31, 34, 244 P.2d 21, 23 (1952).
101. De Aryan v. Akers, 12 Cal. 2d 781, 786, 87 P.2d 695, 697 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 581
(1939).
102. Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, I11 Cal. App. 2d 31, 34, 244 P.2d 21, 23 (1952); Clary v.
Basalt Rock Co., 99 Cal. App. 2d 458, 461, 222 P.2d 24, 26 (1950).
103. See note 102 .supra.
104. Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. De Salvo, 136 Cal. App. 2d 156, 162,288 P.2d 317, 320
(1955); Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, 111 Cal. App. 2d 31, 35, 244 P.2d 21, 24 (1952).
105. De Aryan v. Akers, 12 Cal. 2d 781,787, 87 P.2d 695, 697 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 581
(1939); Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. De Salvo, 136 Cal. App. 2d 156, 162, 288 P.2d 317, 320
(1955); Pacific Coast Eng'r Co. v. State, 111 Cal. App. 2d 31, 35, 244 P.2d 21, 24 (1952). Now that
there is no prohibition against advertising that the retailer will absorb or assume the sales tax,
there may be an issue of unfair competition as, theoretically, the strong retailer can build up trade
at the expense of the weaker seller---the very inequity the former statute purportedly sought to
avoid. See De Aryan v. Akers, 12 Cal. 2d 781, 787, 87 P.2d 695, 697 (1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
581 (1939). Furthermore, should the retailer absorb the tax or should the tax actually be a retailer
tax, the complementary sales and use tax package becomes distorted. See text accompanying note
33 supra. This distortion will occur because the purchaser buying goods within the state will pay
no tax, while the purchaser buying such goods outside state borders for use, consumption or stor-
age within California must pay the use tax. See text accompanying note 31 supra. Although the
goods are taxed once, see text accompanying note 33 supra, those persons buying goods outside
the state for use in California will consequently have to pay six percent more than for an identical
item purchased within the state.
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Consequently, based on the similarities in both the statutory form
and construction of California and Massachusetts law, 10 6 the underly-
ing rationale of the United States Supreme Court in the Diamond case
becomes evident. The conviction of the Court that the California sales
tax at the time of the Diamond decision was required to be passed on to
the purchaser, thereby placing the legal incidence of the sales tax on the
purchaser, 10 7 countermanded 40 years of California judicial construc-
tion to the contrary.
To remove from the sales tax law those provisions that could be con-
strued to place the legal incidence of the tax on the purchaser, the Cali-
fornia Legislature repealed the aforementioned statutes and enacted
other related changes.' 08 Nevertheless, California sales tax law, as al-
tered by Senate Bill 472, cannot be successfully sustained if a challenge
grounded on federal immunity is brought before the United States
Supreme Court.
THE EFFECT OF SENATE BILL 472 ON THE DIAMOND DECISION
In establishing why Senate Bill 472 cannot alter California sales tax
law sufficiently to withstand another challenge before the United States
Supreme Court, it is important to note again the incorporation of the
sales tax reimbursement schedule and the presumptions regarding sales
tax reimbursement into the sales tax law.'09 It is this comment's con-
tention that both are indicative of a consumer tax.
The sales tax reimbursement schedule is used to determine the
amount owed by the purchaser to the retailer in reimbursement for the
tax paid by the latter to the state. The California Supreme Court, in
Western Lithograph Company v. State Board of Equalization,I" recog-
nized that the controversy surrounding the imposition of the sales tax
had resulted in large part from the inclusion in the sales tax law of a
specific method whereby the retailer might calculate reimbursement." '
The sales tax schedule, formerly contained in the Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code, 2 would have been repealed by Senate Bill 472 as originally
introduced" 3 because it was considered to be inconsistent with the con-
cept that the tax is incident on the retailer.' 14 The schedule was re-
placed in the final version of Senate Bill 472, however, as an addition to
106. See text accompanying notes 93-105 supra.
107. Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd, of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268 (1976).
108. See CAL. STATs. 1978, c. 1211, §§1-22, at -.
109. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1656.1. See note 23 m.sura.
110. 11 Cal. 2d 156, 78 P.2d 731 (1938)-
111. Id. at 167, 78 P.2d at 735.
112. CAL. STAT. 1973, c. 296, §5, at 706.
113. SB 472, 1977-78 Regular Session, as introduced, March 7, 1977.
114. See CAL. STAT. 1978, c. 1211, §19, at-.
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the Civil Code rather than the Revenue and Taxation Code."15 This
curious relocation of a tax schedule from the Revenue and Taxation
Code to the Civil Code arguably indicates an intent to sweep a contro-
versial provision under the rug.
Additionally, the presumptions enacted by Senate Bill 472 possess
consumer tax characteristics." 6 The purchaser is presumed to have
agreed to the addition of sales tax reimbursement to the sales price
when the sales tax is shown on a sales check or other proof of sale, or
when the retailer posts on the premises or includes in an advertisement
or on a price tag a notice that sales tax reimbursement is added to the
sales price. 117 Any one of these routine business practices automati-
cally triggers the presumption that the purchaser has agreed to pay the
sales tax." i8 Furthermore, if the retailer posts on the premises or in-
cludes on a price tag or in an'advertisement that the price of taxable
items includes sales tax reimbursement, it is presumed that the property
was sold at a price that included sales tax reimbursement." 9 Conse-
quently, the circumstances giving rise to the presumptions that the pur-
chaser agreed to the addition of the sales tax and that the property is
sold at a price that includes the sales tax, result in direct imposition of
the tax on the purchaser, thereby placing the legal incidence of the tax
on the purchaser. This effect is distinguishable from the ordinary shift
of a business or property tax that is reflected in a higher price.'
20
The manner in which the Internal Revenue Service treats the sales
tax for purposes of deductibility is also significant to the determination
of legal incidence, because taxes generally are deductible only by the
person upon whom they are imposed.' 2 ' It is the purchaser in Califor-
nia who is allowed by the Internal Revenue Service to deduct state and
local sales taxes paid in the computation of his or her federal income
tax when the tax was separately stated at the time it was paid.122 This is
true even though the voluntary assumption of tax liability ordinarily
does not give rise to a deductible item,123 and even though the inci-
dence of the sales tax, under the imposing statute, does not fall on the
consumer."2 In this instance, however, state and local sales taxes may
115. Compare CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 296, §5, at 706 with CAL. CIv. CODE §1656.1(c)(1).
116. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1656.1. See note 23 supra.
117. See note 23 supra.
118. See note 23 supra.
119. See note 23 supra.
120. See generally Western Lithograph Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 11 Cal. 2d 156, 163,
78 P.2d 731, 735 (1938).
121. Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394, 396 (1942) (citing TREAS. REG. 94, ART. 23(c)-i
(1936) (Revenue Act of 1936), 1 FED. REG. 1802, 1824 (1936).
122. See 26 C.F.R. §1.164-5 (1978).
123. Borland v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1941).
124. See 26 C.F.R. §1.164-5 (1978).
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be deducted from gross income in computing federal income tax only if
the tax is a sales tax as distinguished from an excise orprivilege tax or
other form of exaction."5 California claims that the tax on the sale of
tangible personal property is a privilege tax, 26 yet the Internal Reve-
nue Service allows the deduction. Consequently, it appears that the
federal government recognizes that in substance, the tax imposed on
sales of personalty in California is a sales tax, as opposed to a privilege
or excise tax and that it is imposed on the consumer although statutory
form places the incidence of the tax on the retailer.
Moreover, the treatment accorded the sales tax by the State of Cali-
fornia for purposes of deductibility is highly persuasive as an indication
of the legal incidence of the tax. The Franchise Tax Board authorizes
the purchaser to deduct state and local sales taxes paid in computation
of the purchaser's state income tax. 27 The applicable statute addition-
ally expresses the legislative intent that, to the extent that the tax was
separately stated, the sales tax paid by the consumer "shall be treated
as a tax imposed on and paid by such consumer."1 28
Furthermore, the factors that give rise to a contractual obligation im-
plied in any sales transaction regarding sales tax reimbursement are
nearly identical to the conditions required by the Internal Revenue
Service for a finding that the sales tax was separately stated for pur-
poses of deducting the sales tax from federal income tax. 129 A reading
of Senate Bill 472 discloses that the conformity of factors giving rise to
both the presumptions and tax deductibility was enacted with the intent
to provide a method enabling the purchaser to deduct the sales tax
from income to be reported on federal and state tax returns. 30 Under
these circumstances, the enactment of this provision attests to the tacit
acknowledgement of the legislature that the sales tax is actually inci-
dent on the purchaser.' 3'
125. Commissioner v. Thompson, 193 F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir. 1951).
126. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §6051.
127. Id. §17204(a)(3).
128. Id. §17204(b)(5) (emphasis added).
129. Compare CAL. Clv. CODE §1656.1(a), (b) with 26 C.F.R. §1.164-5 (1978). Section 1.164-5
provides in part:
The requirement that the amount of tax must be separately stated will be deemed com-
plied with where it clearly appears that at the time of sale to the consumer, the tax was
added to the sales price and collected or charged as a separate item. It is not necessary,
for the purpose of this section, that the consumer be furnished with a sales slip, bill,
invoice, or other statement on which the tax is separately stated. For example, where the
law imposing the state or local tax for which the taxpayer seeks a deduction contains a
...provision requiring a posted notice stating that the tax will be added to the quoted
price, or a requirement that the tax be separately shown in advertisements or separately
stated on all bills and invoices, it is presumed that the amount of the state or local tax
was separately stated at the time paid by the consumer.
130. See CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1211, §22, at-
131. For example, in a press release relating to the introduction of Senate Bill 233, a bill
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Inconsistencies in the regulations promulgated by the State Board of
Equalization are probative of the weakness of the stance taken by the
legislature in declaring the sales tax to be legally incident on the re-
tailer.132 The regulations provide that sales tax is to be imposed on
leases of tangible personal property to the United States and on sales to
certain federal instrumentalities. 13 3 Sales tax does not apply, however,
to sales or leases to Indians who reside on a reservation whether negoti-
ated on or off the reservation when the property is delivered on the
reservation. 134 Additionally, the regulations provide that neither sales
nor use tax applies to the sale or use of tangible personal property to
foreign consul officers, employees or their families.' 35 These exemp-
tions are inconsistent with the premise that the sales tax is a privilege
tax imposed on the retailer, because if that were the case, it would be
irrelevant that the purchaser is someone who would be exempt had the
legal incidence been on that purchaser.
36
Furthermore, economic realities as well as statutory law are consid-
ered in determining the legal incidence of a state tax.137 For example,
in First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax Commission, 3  the
Court found that business practicalities resulted in a passing on of the
tax, 139 and in United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission,140 a sales tax
in the form of a wholesale markup on liquor sold to military installa-
tions was held to be imposed unconstitutionally.' 4 1 Because the appli-
cable regulation promulgated by the Tax Commission required the
distributors to collect the tax from the military, the tax was legally inci-
dent on the United States. 42 Moreover, the Court stated that "even in
the absence of this clear statement of the Tax Commission's intentions,
obvious economic realities compelled the distillers to pass on the eco-
nomic burden of the markup."'143 In these two cases, the Court invali-
dated state sales taxes on the grounds that the taxes were required to be
proposing a reduction in the amount of the sales tax as opposed to an income tax exemption
credit, the author stated, "All tax payers contribute to California's continuing surplus, and all
should share in the pleasure of paying less taxes." Senator John W. Holmdahl, Press Release,
Sales Tax Reduction Proposal before State Senate, January 19, 1979 (emphasis added).
132. Compare 18 CAL. ADM. CODE §1614 with id. at §1616 andid at §1619.
133. 18 CAL. ADM. CODE §1614(a), (c).
134. Id. §1616(d).
135. Id. §1619.
136. See, e.g., 32 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 262-63 (1958) (sales to Indians not exempt from sales or use
taxes because tax on retailer).
137. See generally United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599, 609-10 n.8 (1975);
First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 348 (1968).
138. 392 U.S. 339 (1968).
139. Id. at 348.
140. 421 U.S. 599 (1975).
141. Id. at 613.
142. Id. at 608-09.
143. Id. at 609-10 n.8 (emphasis added).
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passed on to the purchaser and in part that economic realities ordained
an identical result. Consequently, whether mandated by statutory law
or by business practicalities, the sales tax of necessity is passed on and
the practical effect is a direct imposition of the tax on the purchaser.
Finally, the United States Supreme Court is not bound to accept the
expressed intent of the California Legislature nor the determination of
California courts regarding the legal incidence of the state sales tax. 14
This statement would appear to be contradictory to a concept inherent
in federalism that the highest court of a state is the final arbiter of state
law.' 45 The legal incidence of the state sales tax is normally a matter
for determination by state courts 146 and, admittedly, a significant aspect
of state autonomy is the power of taxation. 47 But when federal rights
are involved and when state law impinges on constitutionally protected'
areas, the determination of legal incidence is a federal question.'
48
Confusion in this area is attributable to past inconsistent statements by
the United States Supreme Court in reference to the binding effect of
the declarations of a state legislature and interpretations of state courts
concerning the legal incidence of a tax. 149 The posture of the present
Court, however, is in accord with the principles that the Court is not
bound by the characterization of a state court regarding the incidence
of a tax when questions of federal immunity are raised, nor is express
legislative intent controlling when the practical operation and effect of
the law is inconsistent with statutory form.' 50
In the final analysis, California has employed a legal fiction in plac-
ing the incidence of the sales tax on the retailer to evade a confronta-
tion with the federal immunity doctrine.'' The United States Supreme
144. See Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268 (1976).
145. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200,208 (1975). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X; L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301-02 (1978).
146. See Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1,
9-10 (1941).
147. See Comment, Federal Immunity from Stale Taxation: A Reassessment, 45 U. CHI. L.
Rnv. 695, 717 (1978).
148. First Agricultural Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1968); Kern-
Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954); United States v. State Bd. of Equalization,
450 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (1978).
149. The following is a sampling of inconsistent statements by the United States Supreme
Court regarding the effect of state legislation and judicial interpretations on the legal incidence of
a tax. "These determinations of the incidence of the tax by the state court are controlling, ... "
Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 99 (1941). "There can be no doubt
from the clear wording of the statute that the Massachusetts Legislature intended that this sales
tax be passed on to the purchaser. For our purposes, at least, that intent is controlling." First
Agricultural Nat'1 Bank v. State Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1968). "We are not bound by
the California court's contrary conclusion..." Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
425 U.S. 268, 268 (1976).
150. See Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 425 U.S. 268, 268 (1976); Gurley
v. Phoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975).
151. Another practical objective in employing this legal fiction is to facilitate collection of the
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Court has pierced this facade and is not likely to succumb to legislative
exhortations merely because California sales tax law has been altered
in form but not substance. The aggregate force of the above arguments
presage the probable success of a constitutional challenge to the
amended sales tax law embodied in Senate Bill 472.
CONCLUSION
The California retail sales tax is a major source of revenue for the
state.' 52 The holding of the United States Supreme Court in Diamond
National Corporation v. State Board of Equalization that the legal inci-
dence of the sales tax falls upon the purchaser, 153 invalidated the impo-
sition of sales tax on sales of tangible personal property to federal
instrumentalities and on leases of such property to the United States
Government. Thus, the revenue derived from these transactions was
reduced proportionately. In an effort to alter the sales tax law to avoid
a future application of the Diamond holding, Senate Bill 472 was en-
acted.' 54 This legislative response, however, will meet with failure on
challenge to the United States Supreme Court. Among the reasons for
this failure are the operation and effect of the law which remain basi-
cally unchanged from that in force at the time of the Diamond decision,
and the inevitable consequence under such a taxing scheme that the
consumer must pay the tax to acquire the purchased property. Accord-
ingly, two alternatives are available to the State of California. One al-
ternative is to exempt from taxation all sales and leases of tangible
personal property to the federal government. The alternative best cal-
culated to secure the objective of the state, however, is to seek congres-
sional sanction for permissible imposition of sales tax on leases to the
United States Government and on sales to its incorporated instrumen-
talities.
Faith . Geoghegan
tax by the state. The retailer is required to secure a permit from the state to engage in the retail
trade. See CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE §6066. Thus, subjection of the retailer to legal liability for
payment of the tax avoids the difficulties associated with an attempted collection of the tax by the
state from each purchaser on each individual sale and consequent legal action upon default of the
purchaser.
152. See GOVERNOR'S BUDGET FOR 1979-80 at A-6 (1979).
153. 425 U.S. at 268.
154. See CAL. STATS. 1978, c. 1211, §19, at-.
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